

Secure and Private Wireless-Edge Networking via Named Data

security
seamless
management
scalable
data-centric
privacy trust
access-control
localize-compromise
user-friendly
automated-security

Jay (Satyajayant) Misra, misra@cs.nmsu.edu



Part of the ICE-AR team, led by Prof. Lixia Zhang




Use-cases for ICE-AR



Campus Scenario

Infrastructure and
Compute Support,
Trusted devices


ICE-AR: Minimum
effort transition
possible



Disaster Scenario

Disrupted
communication,
diverse agencies, wide-
trust spectrum

Diverse Device Classes and Capabilities



Powerful Devices

API, Accelerator, Wireless AP,
BS (cells: femto, micro, etc.),
First-responder vehicles

PKI; Acceleration; GPUs.

Somewhat Constrained Devices

Smart phones, Tablets, Head-
mounted displays

PKI, Symmetric Key Infrastructure;
Some acceleration

Low-power Devices

IoT devices, sensors, etc.

Symmetric Key; Low-cost
hashing, Hash-chains

Threat Model

Insider Threat Incidents Are Pervasive



Source: 2013 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine, U.S. Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University, and Price Waterhouse Cooper, June 2013



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Outsider Attack

Only guest identity/certs (at best),
no pervasive routing

Insider Attack

Valid Identities, Certificates,
Namespaces, Routes
(*Trusted (students, faculty); Semitrusted (guests of trusted entity); Untrusted (visitors)*)

Fake data, hijacking name-prefix;
sinkhole, blackhole, wormhole, DoS/DDoS

Passive monitoring and traffic
analysis, jamming to disrupt
communications, probing network
structure

Cannot perform DoS/DDoS as does
not have credentials to sign packets

NDN: “intrinsic data provenance/ authenticity”

Conceptually
simple

Realization is a giant research task

No concept of
identity of netizens

Open env., large scale cert.
distribution not feasible

◇ Name-based solutions

Scalable Trust
Management

Data Security &
Access Control

Location-based
identity

Acceleration for
scalability at line-speed




"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

Image Credit:


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_you%27re_a_dog

Example: A camera publishing data into the network




- NDN protocol stack
 - NFD: for network connectivity
- Routing configuration
 - Discovery of local hub & prefixes
 - Local data prefixes propagation
- Identity/Certificate
 - Sign Data with the certificate corresponded to identity
 - Data can be authenticated as it travels through the network

Identity Management



- ◇ Every application has corresponding identity (namespace) and certificate for this namespace
- ◇ Applications could manage sub-identities and their certificates (working in progress)


Schematized Trust at Scale



Specific Research Tasks:

- Trust rules *generalization* for the device universe;
- *Extension* to different trust settings (sp. Edge/IoT devices, AP, drone);
- *Automated* trust-level assignment for data based on reputation index for data sources;
- Conflating diverse data streams to increase information trust level.

Schematized Trust Illustration for on-campus scenario.



Named Data Security and Access Control at Scale

For all devices other than low-power “things”.

Named Content: “/ucla/people/student/class/CS400”

Named Key: “/ucla/people/student/class/CS400/videocam/KEY”

For the low-power “things”:



- hierarchical n/w
- mutually authenticated secure onboarding
- secure comms. with controller using symm. keys
- off-loading of computation to controller

Specific Research Tasks:

- exploring scalable AC using ABE, CP-ABE, broadcast enc.;
- extension of basic auth. model with secure on-boarding for IoT.
- **How to scale?**

Identity-mapping + trust-offloading: Capable devices.


Up-to-the clouds

Data aggregation,
processing, acceleration,
coordination, anomaly
detection, location
certification, data
publication

Foggy-bottom

PKI for
bootstrapping
and signatures

Dynamic
session keys
for content
enc.




Identity-mapping + trust-offloading: IoT to Controller.

Up-to-the clouds

Data aggregation,
processing, acceleration,
coordination, anomaly
detection, location
certification, data
publication;
namespace compaction;
content re-encryption


Foggy-bottom

Symmetric
keys for
enc./dec,
message
authentication



Transfer of
reputation and
access levels
(Both data and
operations)

Can we perform *secure, seamless on-boarding and routing* for devices?



Scalability, efficiency, synchronized multi-interface, multi-technology, configurability, security, ...

Hierarchical topology, multi-level routing, identity-mapping, namespace management, ...

User privacy in the many-to-many multi-source to multi-sink model

- ◇ Anonymity and accountability trade-off
 - Can we bridge the gap?
 - ▷ Conditional privacy with mutual authentication
- ◇ Challenges of multi-modal and large data volume generated by users
 - Diverse sources enable better analytics: Differential privacy?
- ◇ Challenges/opportunities in preserving privacy of devices/users
 - Scale, application diversity, technology diversity

Location-based Signature and Privacy at Scale

Granular, Location Based Identity

Efficient Signature Generation/Verification


Identity Privacy

Specific Research Tasks:

- Efficient, private location-based namespace creation for all *producers* (including IoT devices);
- Signature generation/verification time efficiency techniques
 - (e.g., XORing packets' hashes for single verification) and
 - use of h/w acceleration;
- enhanced naming for efficient identity privacy for devices (including IoT devices) and users
 - pseudonyms, conditional privacy, anonymous mutual authentication

Where to use acceleration in security?

- ◇ Signature generation/verification and stronger content encryption:



- ◇ Faster encryption to reduce latency as needed, for content aggregation, query response, or post-processing data
 - Improving hardware implementations, e.g., Intel AES-NI
 - Implementing **other** symm. key algorithms (Speck, Simon, etc.*)
 - Named-functions for security and privacy-preserving computations.
- ◇ False Data Injection Mitigation
 - Wireless AP, aggregators, and controller
 - ▷ Correlating different data streams for in-network data/device validation

* D. Dinu, Y. L. Corre, D. Khovratovich, L. Perrin, J. Großschädl, and A. Biryukov. "Triathlon of Lightweight Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things." *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2015, p.209. <http://eprint.iacr.org/>.

Things we have abstract ideas on.

- ◇ Use of schematized trust across the spectrum of “capable” devices
- ◇ Concept of name-based access control; where, how, when to use it?
- ◇ Location based signature and privacy and leveraging it
- ◇ Using AaaS for signatures, encryption, computations, etc.

Things we need to investigate.

- ◇ How to **scale** it up?



- ◇ **Configurable security** for the diverse devices in the ensemble?
 - Symm. keys, PKI, new ciphers, new reputation and access control mechanisms
- ◇ Security infrastructure working through disruptions?
- ◇ Security and privacy implications of data diversity and disruptions at scale?

Thank you!